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| 我国政府扶贫机制再造研究 |
| Renovation of Chinese Government' s Poverty Alleviation Mechanism |
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| DOI： |
| 中文关键词: 扶贫机制 再造 委托代理 |
| 英文关键词: Pover ty alleviation mechanism Renovation Principal-agent theory |
| 基金项目: |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 目前我国政府在农村的扶贫效率日渐低下, 其中一个重要原因就是政府扶贫体制的组织效率低下。为
了设计出一个激励相容的扶贫机制, 以提高政府扶贫效率, 本文在考虑了各种实际情况下, 运用委托代理理论, 对
中央政府与地方政府扶贫制度进行了重新设计。文章认为中央政府应对地方政府进行激励, 并且其绩效考核的标
准不仅包括贫困人口减少的数量, 还应包括其他变量(如当地自然条件、经济环境等), 同时在扶贫资金的拨付上,
采取分期付款的方式, 以应对由于生命周期的缘故而导致的地方政府不合作行为。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| The efficiency of Chinese Government' s po verty alleviation in rural areas has been on the decline in recent years.One of
the important reasons is that the institutional efficiency of the government poverty alleviation is low .This ar ticle proposes a renovation
of the central g overnment and local government poverty alleviatio n mechanism , borrowing on the principal-agent theory and w eighing
v arious factors.The authors maintain that the central go vernment should provide incentives fo r the local government , and the evaluatio
n criteria should include no t only the decrease of the number of poo r population , but also other variables such as the environment
and economical environment , e tc .In addition , pover ty alleviatio n funds should be delivered in installments to avoid the non-cooperatio
n behavior of local governments due to the life cy cle reasons . |
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