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| 部门预算委托代理问题的分析与解决对策 |
| Analysis and Strategy of the Agent Issue in Government Department Budget |
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| DOI： |
| 中文关键词: |
| 英文关键词: Agent theory Department budget Supervision mechanism |
| 基金项目: |
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| 摘要点击次数: 842 |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 文章将原本用于研究企业经济行为的委托代理理论引入到政府领域, 指出作为纳税人的社会公众与政
府之间, 本质上是一种委托— 代理关系。在部门预算中, 该委托代理关系表现为社会公众—(议会)人民代表大会
—政府— 政府财政部门— 政府职能部门的多环节委托授权链条, 由于信息不对称、监督弱化、对腐败惩罚程度轻等
原因, 且在公共领域内存在“ 激励不足”情况下, 解决部门预算委托代理问题的办法主要是依靠建立有效的监督机
制。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| This paper bor rows the ag ency theory that is o riginally used for the analysis of co rporate economic activities into the government
sector .I t say s the relation betw een the public and the government is, in essence , one fo rm of principal-agent relation .In department
budget , this principal-agent relation is expressed as a deleg ation chain from the public — the people' s cong ress (the parliament)
— the gover nment-finance department of the go vernment-o ther functional departments of the government .In light of problems
like info rmation asymmetry , weak supervision , light punishment for corruption , and “lack of motivation” in public secto r , the
primary approach is to establish an effective supervision mechanism |
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