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| 农村信用社改革中道德风险分析与规避 |
| Moral Hazards Analysis and Evasion in the Reformof Rural Credit Cooperatives |
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| DOI: |
| 中文关键词: 农村信用社 道德风险 不完全合同 规避 |
| 英文关键词: Rural credit cooperatives Moral hazards Evasion I ncomplete contract |
| 基金项目: |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 文章对农村信用社改革的总体思路进行了全面回顾, 提出中央、地方和农村信用社之间的不完全合同
以及由此产生的道德风险问题是影响当前农村金融制度运行低效率的重要因素, 农村信用社道德风险发生机制比
较复杂, 表现更具隐蔽性, 对制度的设计和执行具有更高的要求, 规避农村信用社改革中道德风险应当成为提高制
度运行效率的重要议题。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| This paper reviews the major ideas and institutional consequences of Rural Credit Coo perative reform in recent y ears.The
majo r reason causing rural financial performance inefficiency is the incomplete contract betw een the central government , the local government
and the rural credit cooperatives, as w ell as the subsequent moral hazards resulting from the incomplete contract.The mechanism
fermenting such moral hazards among rural credit cooperative is mo re complicated and hidden, w hich calls fo r higher requirements
in the design and implementation of systems.Evading moral hazards in rural credit cooperatives has been an impo rtant topic in
improving their efficiency . |
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