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| 基于博弈分析的农村信用社产权改革路径选择 |
| Path Selection of Rural Credit Co-Operatives in TheirOwnership Reform, a Game Theory Perspective |
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| DOI： |
| 中文关键词: 农村信用社 博弈分析 产权 行为选择 |
| 英文关键词: Rural credit co-operatives Game theory analysis Ow nership rig ht Behavio r selection |
| 基金项目:山东省社会科学规划“农村经济研究” 基金项目(2005-2007)(项目批准号:04AJJ10)———《山东省农村信用社产
权制度试点改革研究》课题研究阶段成果。 |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 随着我国农村信用社改革的步步深化, 新型产权组织模式与运行机制的构建已经走到了攻坚阶段。文
章在归纳分析农村信用社改革与发展背景及基本现状的基础上, 围绕政府与农村信用社双方的益损值, 对政府推
行农村信用社合作制规范进行了博弈分析, 由最终的纳什均衡分析结果, 得出了在现有农村信用社基础上搞统一
的合作制规范不切实际, 农村信用社改革必须走“ 多元化” 产权组织模式道路的结论, 并就新时期如何进一步发展
与完善农村信用社“多元化” 产权组织模式提出了几点政策性建议。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| With the deepening of rural credit co-operatives, restructuring of ow nership and operation mechanism have reached the
critical stage .By analyzing the dev elo pment and cur rent situation of rural credit co-operatives, the article makes a g ame theory analysis
of the local governments and their role in standardizing the operations of rural credit co-operatives.The results of Nash equilibrium
show that it is impractical to have a uniform standard for rural co-operatives.Rural co-operatives have to follow multiple patterns in
their development.Policy design proposals are also made on how to further develop rural credit co-opera tiv es under the pluralized ow nership
concept. |
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